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Abstract— A hierarchical game theoretic decision making
framework is exploited to model driver decisions and inter-
actions in traffic. In this paper, we apply this framework to
develop a simulator to evaluate various existing autonomous
driving algorithms. Specifically, two algorithms, based on Stack-
elberg policies and decision trees, are quantitatively compared
in a traffic scenario where all the human-driven vehicles are
modeled using the presented game theoretic approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Predictive models of driver actions in complex traffic
scenarios have several potential applications for autonomous
vehicle control. Firstly, these models can be employed in
simulators to generate realistic traffic scenarios, which can
be utilized for testing, verification and validation, and com-
parison of competing autonomous driving control algorithms.
Such simulators can save time in the development phase
by providing a model-based testing environment, before the
actual road tests. Secondly, these models can be used in the
design of hierarchical control schemes for driverless cars:
typically, in an autonomous vehicle, a higher level outer
loop controller generates the reference trajectories for the
lower level inner loop controller, which determines the steer-
ing angles, acceleration/deceleration inputs, etc., required to
follow the reference trajectory [1]. Predictive driver models
can be utilized in the higher level outer loop controller
generating the reference trajectories for the lower level inner
loop controller, thereby ensuring similar behavior to that of
a human-driven vehicle and improving the comfort level of
the passengers [1]. In addition, these models can provide
predictions of the future trajectories of the vehicles in the
vicinity of the host autonomous vehicle and be used as
inputs for the inner loop controllers such as model predictive
controllers (MPC) [2]–[4].
The literature on driver modeling is vast. In [5] and [6],
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based driver models are
considered, which are developed using real driving data. In
[7] and [8], k-means clustering is used to determine the
driving mode, and an approach to predict and overbound
future vehicle trajectory is proposed. It is shown that a
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prediction of the driver inputs can improve the performance
of an assisted driving algorithm. In [9], a “cognitive archi-
tecture” approach, which is “a computational framework that
incorporates built-in, well-tested parameters and constraints
on cognitive and perceptual-motor processes,” is utilized for
driver modeling. Built in logical (if-then-else) rules are used
to represent the decision making process. In [10], lane change
behavior of drivers is modeled using a multi agent simulation
system called “Simulation of Intelligent TRAnsport Systems
(SITRAS).” Several logical algorithms are used to model the
decision making during lane changes. The resulting actions
of the drivers are therefore predefined with strict rules. Driver
aggressiveness can also be incorporated into the model by
tuning certain parameters.
Some other references represent drivers as feedback con-
trollers (e.g., see [11]–[15]). In [16], another driver model is
proposed, in which support vector machines together with a
Bayesian filter are used to capture the intention of a driver for
a lane change, which can then be used as an input to a driver
assistance system. The method uses local measurements such
as the lateral position in a lane, the steering angle, and the
derivatives of these variables, to predict a lane change before
it occurs. A comprehensive list of existing human driver
models, control based or behavioral based, can be found in
[17], [18].
With respect to the existing approaches, the present paper
is distinguished by advanced modeling of driver-to-driver
interactions in traffic scenarios using a specific game the-
oretic formulation which is scalable to multiple vehicles.
The proposed method of traffic modeling has the following
advantages: a) driver responses to environmental changes
are determined utilizing a human decision making process,
instead of assuming that the actions of the drivers are
known in advance for a given state of the system, b) multi-
ple human-human and human-automation (e.g., autonomous
cars) interactions can be modeled simultaneously, which
helps investigate traffic scenarios with several vehicles and
c) all the vehicles in a traffic scenario can simultaneously
be modeled as decision makers (as opposed to predicting
the decisions of one vehicle while assuming that the rest of
the vehicles move based on certain kinematic and dynamic
constraints), in a computationally tractable way.
The exploited game theoretic model makes it possible to
conduct a quantitative analysis of the traffic. For example,
a) the increase in the number of accidents corresponding
to the increase in the traffic density can be estimated, b)
the effect of certain parameter value selections in an au-
tonomous driving algorithm on the safety of the vehicle can
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be evaluated, c) competing autonomous driving algorithms
can be compared quantitatively in a multi-vehicle time-
extended scenario, based on certain safety and performance
metrics, and finally, d) these quantitative analyses can be used
for optimization purposes based on a predefined objective
function including safety and performance measures. What
makes the above mentioned analyses possible is a method
that uniquely combines game theory, which is used to model
human interactions, and reinforcement learning, which is
used to obtain the policy which models the driver actions.
At the core of this method is an approach known as “semi
network-form games” [19], which helps us obtain the prob-
able outcomes of a complex traffic scenario in the presence
of multiple driver-driver interactions.
There have been other game theoretic approaches proposed
to model highway driving, such as [20] and [21]. Although
these approaches exploit driver interaction models developed
in a game theoretic setting, they did not consider dynamic
(multi-move) scenarios. The latter are exploited in [22] for
Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV) energy management where
the driver and the powertrain are considered to be two
players in a game. However, increasing the number of players
(drivers, in our case) beyond three complicates computing a
Stackelberg solution, especially in a time extended (multi-
move) scenario. On the other hand, the hierarchical reasoning
based game theoretic approach exploited in this paper is
easily scalable. Indeed, an implementation of the proposed
approach for a 50 player game can be found in [23], and
scenarios with up to 25 vehicles are treated in this paper.
Some preliminary results of using our game theoretic
approach for driver modeling presented in this paper have
been published in [24], including the application of rein-
forcement learning and the demonstration of the effect of
driver level on the number of lane changes and driving safety.
In this paper, we show that a traffic simulator consisting
of interacting drivers that are modeled using the proposed
approach can be utilized to quantitatively and comparatively
evaluate different autonomous driving methods. As case
studies, we present simulation results for two different au-
tonomous driving methods, based on Stackelberg equilibrium
policies and decision trees, and compare them in terms of
safety and performance.
The organization of this paper is as follows: The problem
formulation is given in Section II. The process of obtaining
driver policies by exploiting game theory and reinforcement
learning is explained in Section III. The autonomous driving
algorithms to be tested and compared are described in
Section IV. Simulation results are reported in Section V.
Finally, a summary is given in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem we treat in this paper is to model the behavior
of drivers in a traffic scenario where the cars are driven on
a 3-lane highway. We then demonstrate that such models
can be used in simulators to evaluate autonomous vehicle
policies. Fig. 1 shows an example scenario with 6 cars. Note
that using the method we propose, scenarios with more cars
and more lanes can be handled.
Fig. 1: Traffic in a 3-lane highway.
In this scenario, the cars are assumed to be traveling in
the same direction and driven by human drivers who obey
the general traffic laws.
A. Action space
Drivers are assumed to have 5 basic actions:
1) “Maintain” current speed,
2) “Accelerate” at rate = 2.5 m/s2, provided velocity does
not exceed 98 km/h,
3) “Decelerate” at rate = −2.5 m/s2, provided velocity is
above 62 km/h,
4) Change lane to the left,
5) Change lane to the right.
This action space may represent typical actions that human
drivers may use in highway traffic. A larger action space may
improve the fidelity of the model, while also increasing its
complexity. The exploration of larger action spaces is left to
future work.
B. Observation space
In real traffic flows, a driver can neither observe nor
process all the information about all the cars on the road.
A human can possibly observe and use the information
he/she obtains from the cars in a certain vicinity of him/her.
Therefore, we assign the following observation space to the
drivers:
1) The longitudinal distance (range) to the car in front and
in the same lane (front center), quantified as “close”
(range ≤ 30m), “nominal” (30m< range ≤ 60m) or
“far” (range > 60m),
2) The range to the car in front and to the left (front left),
quantified as “close,” “nominal” or “far,”
3) The range to the car in front and to the right (front
right), quantified as “close,” “nominal” or “far,”
4) The range to the car in the rear and to the left (rear
left), quantified as “close,” “nominal” or “far,”
5) The range to the car in the rear and to the right (rear
right), quantified as “close,” “nominal” or “far,”
6) The relative motion of the car in the front center,
quantified as “approaching” (range decreasing), “stable”
(range not changing), or “moving away” (range increas-
ing),
7) The relative motion of the car in the front left, quantified
as “approaching,” “stable” or “moving away,”
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8) The relative motion of the car in the front right, quan-
tified as “approaching,” “stable” or “moving away,”
9) The relative motion of the car in the rear left, quantified
as “approaching,” “stable” or “moving away,”
10) The relative motion of the car in the rear right, quanti-
fied as “approaching,” “stable” or “moving away,”
11) The lane of the car, quantified as “left lane,” “center
lane” or “right lane.”
Similar to the action space, a larger observation space
with more observations may improve the performance of the
model, but may also entail heavier computational effort.
C. Reward function
A “reward function” is a mathematical representation of
the goals of a driver. Basic goals of the drivers in real traffic
are 1) to not have a collision (safety), 2) to minimize the time
needed to reach the destination (performance), 3) to keep a
reasonable headway from preceding cars (comfort) and 4) to
minimize driving effort (comfort).
These goals can be reflected in a reward function given
by
R = w1c+w2v+w3h+w4e, (1)
where wi, i = 1,2,3,4, are the weights for each term and
c,v,h and e represent “collision,” “velocity,” “headway” and
“effort” metrics, respectively.
The weighting terms wi may change depending on the
aggressiveness of the driver, but intuitively, collision avoid-
ance should be the most important factor. Thus, the following
relationship between the weights should be kept: w1 
w2,w3,w4.
These terms are further explained below.
c (collision): The term c gets the value of −1 when a
collision occurs and the value of 0 otherwise. This term
enforces driver’s safety.
v (velocity): The term v gets the value of v =
(current velocity − nominal velocity) ÷ (acceleration rate),
where “nominal velocity” = 80 km/h. This term encourages
the driver to pursue higher traveling speed and shorten travel
time.
h (headway): The term h is set to the following values




−1 if headway is “close,”
0 if headway is “nominal,”
1 if headway is “far.”
(2)
This term reflects the observation that a larger headway
distance improves the safety and comfort of the driver.
e (effort): The term e gets the value of 0 if the driver’s
action is “maintain” and −1 otherwise. This term discourages
the driver from making unnecessary maneuvers.
D. Car dynamics
It is assumed that all cars accelerate/decelerate at
±2.5m/s2, and lane changes occur with constant lateral
velocity such that the total time to change lanes is 3s. We also
assume that during lane changes, the longitudinal velocity
remains constant, and once a lane change begins, it always
continues to completion.
III. OBTAINING HIERARCHICAL REASONING BASED
DRIVER MODELS
A policy is defined as a stochastic map from the obser-
vation space (see Section II-B), to the action space (see
Section II-A), i.e., the drivers have a probability distribution
over their possible actions corresponding to each observation
state. To obtain driver policies, two main tools are exploited:
the hierarchical reasoning game theoretic (also called “level-
k”) approach, and the Jaakkola reinforcement learning algo-
rithm. In this section, both of these tools are explained.
A. Level-k reasoning
The driver models developed in this work are based on the
observation that humans make decisions exploiting various
levels of reasoning. The lowest level, level 0, represents an
intelligent agent (driver) who chooses his/her actions without
considering the possible actions of other agents. For example,
if a driver decides to make a lane change, say, from lane A to
lane B, without considering the possible actions of the other
drivers in the vicinity, that driver is referred to as a level 0
driver. However, if the same driver assumes that the other
drivers are level 0 drivers, and then chooses his/her actions
as the best response to the possible actions of other drivers,
then he/she is referred to as a level 1 driver. So, a level k
driver assumes that the rest of the drivers are level (k− 1)
and acts accordingly. More detailed explanations about this
approach can be found in [25] and [26].
Level 0 policy: In general, level 0 policies are considered
as “reflexive” behavior, the kind of actions one takes without
really taking into account other players’ possible actions.
These actions can be random, meaning that every possible
action is given the same probability of realization given a
state, or it can be a simple but reasonable policy that is
formed using very basic principles of the scenario one is in.








Note that a level 0 driver would never change lanes. As
a matter of fact, it may not be an uncommon assumption in
the simulations of autonomous driving algorithms that other
vehicles in traffic do not change lanes, e.g., see [27], [28].
However, in this work, the level k (k≥1) drivers would make
lane changes to pursue higher rewards, which makes the
traffic model developed by our approach of higher fidelity
compared to some of previous traffic models.
B. Jaakkola reinforcement learning
The Jaakkola reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm (see
[29]) is similar to other conventional RL methods (see
[30]). It involves a policy evaluation step, where state-
action pairs of a policy are assigned values based on the
cumulative rewards gained, and a policy improvement step,
where the existing policy is refined so that actions that
have higher expectations of cumulative reward values have
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increased probability of actually being chosen. A feature
of the Jaakkola RL algorithm is that when the underlying
dynamics of the problem is Markov while the system states
are only partially observable to the agents, i.e., the problem is
modeled as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP), the Jaakkola RL was shown to be able to converge
at least to a local maximum in terms of the average over
infinite horizon rewards under certain conditions [29]. Note
that the highway problem defined in this paper is modeled as
a POMDP, due to the drivers’ restricted observation spaces
(see Section II-B).
C. Complete algorithm
The complete algorithm is a combination of the level-
k reasoning game theory and the Jaakkola reinforcement
learning approach.
To obtain a level k driver policy, we assign level (k− 1)
policies to all the drivers in the traffic except the driver we
want to “train.” By training we mean that we run the Jaakkola
RL algorithm where the trained driver is the learner and the
rest of the drivers, together with the vehicles, constitute the
environment.
To start the procedure, we first assign a level 0 policy
(see Section III-A) to all the drivers except the learner, and
then train a level 1 policy and save it. We then train a level
2 policy by assigning the level 1 policy we just saved to
all the other drivers, and train and save a newly obtained
level 2 policy. This can continue until we reach the depth of
reasoning (level k) we want to achieve. It is shown in some
experimental studies (see [26]) that humans are generally
level 0, 1, or 2 players in a game. Therefore, we train driver
policies up to level 2 in this paper.
IV. EVALUATING AUTONOMOUS DRIVING APPROACHES
Two autonomous driving strategies, based on Stackelberg
policies and decision trees, are evaluated and compared using
a simulator in which the traffic, other than the host vehicle,
consists of drivers modeled using the above level-k approach.
Below, brief explanations of the Stackelberg and decision tree
approaches are provided. See [20], [21], [27], and [31] for
further details.
A. Stackelberg policies
To generate Stackelberg policies for the autonomous ve-
hicle, we consider three vehicles as players, and the rest of
the vehicles are considered to be a part of the environment.
The three players are assigned roles as the “leader,” “first
follower,” and “second follower,” and they choose their
actions sequentially, where the leader chooses its action
first, followed by the first follower, and, finally, the second
follower. Each player evaluates its actions according to a
utility function that consists of two parts. The first, referred
to as the positive utility, is defined as follows:
Upos =
{
min(d,dv), if there is a vehicle ahead,
dv, otherwise,
(4)
where d is the distance to the car in front, and dv is the
maximum visibility distance. The second part of the utility
is referred to as the negative utility:
Uneg = d∇− vrT −dmin, (5)
where d∇ and vr are, respectively, the distance to and the
relative velocity of the car behind, T is a prediction time
window, and dmin is the minimum distance required to allow
a lane change; here, dmin is set to the car length. Thus,
overtaking vehicles are taken into consideration, and lane
changes that cut off overtaking vehicles are discouraged.
The actions chosen by the leader, first follower, and second
follower, denoted by γ, γ f 1, and γ f 2, respectively, are the
Stackelberg equilibrium actions, i.e., the leader chooses its
actions to maximize its utility for the worst-case actions that











where U ′pos and U ′neg are the utilities that correspond to
a specific set of actions {γ,γ f 1,γ f 2}. The two followers
maximize their own utilities with the known choice of γ. In
this paper, when constructing Stackelberg policies, the host
vehicle is the leader, and the two cars immediately behind
are the followers. Alternatively, the host vehicle could be one
of the followers instead of the leader, and this can be treated
similarly.
Note that [20], [21] consider different vehicle dynamics
than the ones in this paper. Additionally, [20], [21] consider
uncertainties in recognition distance, side-viewing, and re-
sponse delays, but these are not considered in this paper.
B. Decision tree policies
In the decision tree approach to autonomous driving, all
vehicles except the host vehicle are a part of the environment,
and it is assumed that the environment evolves determin-
istically over a planning horizon (the vehicles maintain
their current lanes and velocities), independently of the host
vehicle’s actions. The host vehicle maintains its current lane
and velocity unless there is an obstruction in front of it
within a critical headway distance (60m, in this work). If an
action is required, a path planner is triggered that evaluates a
specified number of pre-selected action profiles by building a
tree of potential action sequences and evaluating each branch
according to a specified metric. Branches are pruned from
the decision tree if they lead to collisions or other unsafe
behaviors.
In this paper, the decision tree consists of two layers,
where each layer allows the five actions listed in Section
II-A. Thus, the action profiles consist of two actions each,
and 25 profiles are evaluated. The evaluation metric is the
sum of the headway distances after each action.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Environment and set-up
We model the environment as follows: the width of a
lane is 3.6m, and all cars are modeled as 6m x 2m boxes.
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Fig. 2: Simulation Environment.
Cars always drive at the center of a lane unless they are
changing lanes. All cars accelerate or decelerate at ±2.5m/s2,
and lane changes occur with constant lateral velocity such
that the total time to change lanes is 3s. During lane
changes, the longitudinal velocity remains constant, and once
a lane change begins, it always continues to completion. The
longitudinal axis is called x, and its origin is collocated with
the car that is to be trained or evaluated.
Five cars are observable, as described in Section II-B, and
a car is considered “close” if its relative longitudinal position,
xc ≤ 30, “nominal” if 30 < xc ≤ 60, and “far” if 60 < xc ≤
90, where 90m is considered to be the maximum visibility
distance. Cars more than 90m away are considered to be out
of visual range and unobservable. If no car can be observed
in a position, it is considered equivalent to a car that is “far”
and “moving away.”
Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of an example simulation with
three lanes. The rectangles represent cars, which are all
moving to the right, and the arrows show the velocities of
the cars relative to the car under evaluation, which is located
in the center lane at x = 0. The observation is as follows:
• Front left: close, moving away.
• Front center: far, moving away.
• Front right: far, approaching.
• Rear left: nominal, approaching.
• Rear right: nominal, stable.
• Lane: center.
Note that two cars are unobservable in this scenario. The
car in the front center position is beyond visual range, so
the corresponding observed status is “moving away” even
though it is actually “stable.” Also, the car in the rear right
“far” position is hidden by the car in the rear right “nominal”
position. This reflects the POMDP nature of the problem, as
discussed previously.
Initialization of a simulation requires the specification of
the following values:
1) the number of lanes, n,
2) the number of cars, nc,
3) the maximum allowable initialization distance, x0max,
4) the simulation duration, t f .
When a car is initialized, its position is assigned to a lane
randomly based on uniform distribution, and then it is placed
within that lane randomly based on uniform distribution
in [−x0max,x0max] such that its distance to any previously
initialized cars is at least 30m. Also, the car is initialized
with random longitudinal velocity uniformly distributed in
the range [62,98] km/h and assigned the action “Maintain.”
The car is then assigned a policy to follow (level 0, 1, or 2).
This process repeats until all cars have been initialized, and
then the simulation proceeds according to Algorithm 1.
1 t = 0;
2 while t < t f do
3 foreach car do
4 Get observation from environment;
5 Select action according to policy and
observation;
6 Update position and relative velocity according
to action;
7 end
8 if training a policy then
9 Evaluate reward function for trainee;
10 Update value function;
11 end
12 if the host car is in a collision state then
13 End the simulation;
14 end
15 t = t +Δt;
16 end
Algorithm 1: Single Episode Simulation.
B. Training level-k driver models
When training a new policy, the observation value func-
tion, V , for an observed message m, and the action value
function, Q, for a message/action pair (m,a), are initialized
as follows:
∀m, V (m) = 0;
∀m,∀a, Q(m,a) = 0. (7)
For each observation, the actions are assigned equal proba-





then 0.01 is added to the probability of selecting
argmaxa Q(m,a), after which the action probabilities are
normalized.
The observation space described in Section II-B has 311
different observations. In order to ensure that the learning
algorithm is exposed to a large portion of the observation
space, the trainee needs to be exposed to both sparse and
dense traffic. Therefore, during training, the number of
cars in the traffic is selected randomly, based on uniform
distribution, where 0≤ nc ≤ nmaxc . The maximum number of
cars, nmaxc , is chosen based on the number of lanes and x
0
max
such that if nmaxc cars are placed in the environment, the road
is near full capacity.
Finally, after sufficient training time, we assign the level
0 policy to any observations that were encountered too few
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times during the training for the policy to converge (i.e., not
well trained), so that in such rarely encountered observation
states, a conservative action is performed.
Training then proceeds according to Algorithm 2.
1 step=0;
2 while step < desired training cycles do
3 Randomly select nc ∈ [0,nmaxc ];
4 Initialize all cars with level (k−1) policies;
5 Evaluate the level k policy using Algorithm 1;
6 Improve the policy;
7 step=step+1;
8 end
9 Assign level 0 policy to the not well trained observation
states.
Algorithm 2: Training Process.
Fig. 3 shows the average reward evolution during level 1
and level 2 training. The weights we choose are w1 = 10000,
w2 = 5, w3 = w4 = 1. They can alternatively be calibrated
based on real traffic data, but this will be addressed in our
future work.








































Fig. 3: Average rewards. (a) Training for level 1. (b) Training
for level 2.
After training, we run simulations to check the collision
rate of the trained policy, where collision rate is a metric
for safety defined as the proportion of simulation runs
during which the host vehicle touches another vehicle. Each
simulation is 200s long, and 1,000 simulations are run for
each number of cars, which represents traffic density. As
Fig. 4 shows, the level 2 player has higher collision rates
because it is in a level 1 environment, whose dynamics are
harder to predict than a level 0 environment where the level
1 player performs well.
C. Comparison of Stackelberg and decision tree policies
We consider a traffic environment where 10% of the
drivers make decisions based on level 0 policies, 60% of
the drivers act based on level 1 policies and 30% use level
2 policies. These percentages of various levels are based on
an experimental study conducted in [26]. Fig. 5 shows the
collision rates for the Stackelberg and decision tree policies
vs. the number of cars in the environment. Again, each
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Level 2 vs Level 1
Fig. 4: Collision rates for level 1 and level 2 policies.
Number of cars

















Fig. 5: Collision rates observed in the traffic simulator
configured with 10% level 0, 60% level 1, and 30% level
2 drivers.
simulation is 200s long, and 1,000 simulations are run for
each number of cars.
As Fig. 5 shows, both approaches experience collisions
in the simulations. One explanation for this is that both
algorithms may make erroneous assumptions about the en-
vironment. The Stackelberg approach assumes that only the
host vehicle and two others are decision makers, while the
decision tree approach assumes that only the host vehicle
is a decision maker. In these simulations, however, all
vehicles make observations and take actions to maximize
their rewards. Furthermore, not all collisions represented in
Fig. 5 result from poor decisions of the host vehicle. Other
vehicles in the environment may also be at fault.
In Fig. 5, the Stackelberg policy has fewer collisions.
One explanation for this is that the Stackelberg approach
considers two other vehicles as decision makers, whereas in
the decision tree approach, the host vehicle is assumed to
be the only decision maker. However, both approaches can
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be paired with lower level controllers to provide additional
collision avoidance capability as is done in [31]. Note that
the Stackelberg policy requires more measurements because
it must constantly measure the headway in each of the three
lanes as well as the positions and velocities of the two
followers. On the other hand, during most of the simulation
time, the decision tree policy only requires a measurement of
the headway in its current lane, and additional measurements
are only required when changing lanes.
Note that the above implementations of the two policies
are relatively simple, and serve as case studies to show the
functionality of the traffic simulator developed using the
level-k driver models in testing and evaluation of autonomous
vehicle policies. More evolved implementations of these
policies and their comparisons are left to future publications.
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper, we described a simulator for testing and com-
paring autonomous driving algorithms in terms of predefined
metrics. The simulator consists of human-driven vehicles
whose drivers are modeled as strategic decision makers using
a game theoretic decision making process. As case studies,
autonomous driving algorithms based on Stackelberg policies
and decision tree policies were tested. Their performances
were compared according to a safety metric.
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